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APPROXIMATE ORIGINAL CONTOUR AND
THE TAKING ISSUE-
Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc.
v. Andrus
In Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc.
v. Andrus,' a coal industry association filed a complaint to enjoin
the enforcement of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977.2 The complaint alleged that the Act was unconstitu-
tional on the grounds that it violated the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution which prohibits the taking of private
property without just compensation. The petitioner also contended
that the granting of cessation orders3 without providing for a prior
hearing violates the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
The petitioner further alleged that if the Act was enforced the
association would suffer irreparable harm, thus leaving it without
an adequate remedy at law.
The court applied the test adopted in Blackwelder Furniture
Co. v. Seilig Manufacturing Co.' and granted a preliminary injunc-
tion against the respondents. The injunction was based on a find-
ing by the court that the petitioner had made a strong showing that
it would prevail upon the merits. The court indicated that the
reclamation requirements may be a taking of private property
without just compensation and that the cessation orders issued
under section 521(a) of the Act 5 may violate the due process re-
quirements since they can be issued without prior notice of a hear-
ing.
The court found that the Act's imposition of stringent mea-
sures upon coal mining operations on slopes greater than twenty
degrees made the mining of such coal economically unfeasable.
Since as much as 95% of Virginia coal is located on slopes exceed-
ing twenty degrees, the mining of such coal is commercially im-
practicable under the requirements of the Act. In view of these
circumstances, the court concluded that the Act interfered with
I No. 78-0244-B (D. Va., Feb. 14, 1979) (order granting preliminary injunction)
[hereinafter cited as Virginia Surface Mining]. The Association is a voluntary non-
profit association of approximately 63 small coal producers, the principal purpose
of which is to represent the interests of the coal mining industry in Virginia.
2 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, §§ 101-908, 30
U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328 (West Supp. 1978) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
30 U.S.C.A. § 1271 (West Supp. 1978).
550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977).
30 U.S.C.A. § 1271 (West Supp. 1978).
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the present use of the land (the mining of the coal reserves) and
therefore constituted a taking of property without just compensa-
tion.6
In its truest sense, the Act is a police measure that does not,
in any legal manner, contemplate the taking of private property for
public use. It is generally recognized that a statute which controls
mining within a certain area is not invalid as a confiscation of
property without compensation if these controls appear to bear a
reasonable relation to the protection of the health and safety of
that area.' In fact, the United States Supreme Court has gone so
far as to uphold land regulations that destroyed real property inter-
ests when those regulations were found to be for the general welfare
of society.8
The court in Virginia Surface Mining ignored these cases and
relied heavily on the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon' for
the proposition that the government cannot take private property
without just compensation. In Mahon the claimant conveyed cer-
tain parcels of property but reserved all of the mineral rights with
the intention of developing the coal. The Pennsylvania legislature
subsequently enacted a statute forbidding the mining of coal when
such mining would endanger the surface property. Since the stat-
ute destroyed all of the property rights for which the claimant had
contracted, the Court held that there was a taking without just
compensation.
The Mahon case is understood by many to stand for the propo-
sition that the taking question turns primarily upon the degree of
economic injury imposed by the regulation. However, case law has
progressed to the point that Mahon is no longer considered to
represent the general rule, but rather, an exceptional case. In con-
sidering Mahon, a Massachusetts court'0 noted that the opinion
had been decided by a divided court on peculiar facts and has been
superseded by Supreme Court decisions in which zoning ordi-
nances limiting the removal of minerals from land have been deter-
mined to be reasonable under the circumstances."
Virginia Surface Mining, supra note 1, at 3.
Spillertown v. Prewitt, 21 Il. 2d 228, 171 N.E.2d 582 (1961).
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928).
260 U.S. 393 (1945).
Jo Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 216, 61 N.E.2d 243, cert. denied, 326 U.S.
739 (1945).
1 See Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891
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A more modem approach in deciding whether a government
regulation constitutes a taking was set forth in Goldblatt v.
Hempstead."2 The Goldblatt Court devised a two part test: (1) was
there a diminution in the value of the property, and if so; (2) was
the underlying rationale of the regulation sufficient to justify its
enactment. In deciding whether there was a taking in Virginia
Surface Mining, however, the court relied on the fact that as a
result of the restrictions imposed by the Act the petitioner would
suffer a more severe impact than the rest of the nation's coal prod-
ucers. While the Act may have a greater impact on Virginia coal
companies, that alone should not give rise to a taking. In Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York13 the Supreme Court
recognized that legislation designed to promote the general welfare
commonly burdens some more than others and as such, the mere
fact that the Surface Mining Act has the effect of increasing the
cost of the strip mining should not render the Act unconstitutional.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Act does constitute a tak-
ing, the court in Virginia Surface Mining did not fully comply with
the Goldblatt test since it failed to consider the underlying ration-
ale of the Act in determining whether there was a compensable
taking. Strip mining, while not a nuisance per se, has caused seri-
ous threats to life and property in the form of hazardous flooding,
reduction in water storage and human exposure to potentially dan-
gerous pollutants." The legislative history and case law is so re-
plete with the dangers and environmental impacts of strip mining
that very little need be said about the propriety of exercising these
police powers. 5 The Act represents the government's recognition
of the adverse effects of strip mining on public and private inter-
ests, of the need for regulation of the industry, and of conservation
and restoration of the land.
The standard for reviewing the propriety of the Act requires
that great deference be given to the judgment of the legislature
where, as here, there has been a showing of fundamentally fair
standards enacted for the purpose of preserving the health, safety
(1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973).
12 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
' 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
" H.R. No. 95-218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at RI, reprinted in E19771 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 593.
11 Id. at 59, [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 597.
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and general welfare of the affected area.'" Moreover, the means
adopted by the legislature to accomplish the purposes of the Act
are reasonably necessary for the realization of these objectives. The
requirements of the Act are not unduly oppressive to those engaged
in strip mining. The Act does not reach the degree of regulation
that requires compensation to be paid since the restrictions are
actually insignificant when compared to the overall social benefits
gained.
The district court also found that section 521(a) of the Act,'7
which permits a federal inspector to shut down a mine upon notice
of an alleged violation before the opportunity for a hearing, is a
denial of due process of law in violation of the fifth amendment.
The court based its opinion on the assumption that some irrepara-
ble harm could result from the compelled cessation of the mining
operation. However, this type of expedited administrative auton-
omy is reasonably necessary to protect health and safety, the very
basis for the Act. Thus, the Act sets forth performance standards
for the strip mine industry. If an operation is found to be in viola-
tion of these standards, then cessation of the mining operation
should be permitted until such time as formal proceedings may be
held. Although formal proceedings are delayed, the more impor-
tant interests of public health and safety are safeguarded against
possible continuing harm.
The court, resting its opinion on the possibility of irreparable
damage to the coal companies, failed to consider the irreparable
damage to the environment that could result in the absence of the
Act's expedited procedures. Even assuming that operators would
suffer a loss, it would be a purely economic one and therefore
recoverable. The loss to the public, on the other hand, could result
in a serious and unrecoverable harm to the environment.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,'" has decided
the very issue involved in this case. That court held that a regula-
tion allowing for the immediate cessation of strip mining opera-
tions" without a prior hearing satisfies both the substantive and
procedural due process requirements of the United States Consti-
1 McGinley, Prohibition of Surface Mining in West Virginia, 79 W. VA. L. REv.
445 (1976).
' 30 U.S.C.A. § 1271(a) (West Supp. 1978).
11 Anderson & Anderson Contractors, Inc. v. Latimer, No. 13976 (W. Va.,
March 27, 1979).
" W. VA. CODE § 20-6-14(a) (1978 Replacement Vol.).
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tution. Likewise, a federal court in Pennsylvania 2 0 interpreted a
similar statute authorizing cessation orders as not violating any
constitutional rights.
The cases in the area of governmental taking of private prop-
erty without just compensation are in harmony on at least one
point-that there is no distinct line that can be drawn between
regulation and taking. However, where the regulation in question
involves fundamentally fair standards enacted to protect the
health and safety interests of the public, courts should afford great
deference to the judgment of the legislature. This appears to be the
situation in the Virginia Surface Mining case. In view of the case
law from other jurisdictions, and considering the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 and the facts before the court
in the case, it appears that the petitioner failed to sustain the
heavy burden of showing that the Act went beyond a reasonable
and necessary exercise of the police power.
David Jividen
Lucas v. Morton, 358 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
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